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‘We’re an Empire Now’: 
The United States Between Imperial 
Denial and Premature Decolonization
Niall Ferguson
We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while 
you’re studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creat-
ing other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will 
sort out. We’re history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study 
what we do.
A “senior adviser” to President Bush, as quoted by Ron Suskind1
‘History,’ [Bush] said, shrugging, taking his hands out of his pockets, extend-
ing his arms and suggesting with his body language that it was so far off. ‘We 
won’t know. We’ll all be dead.’
Bob Woodward, quoting President Bush2
Is the United States an empire? It is, I have discovered, acceptable 
to say that it is—provided that you deplore the fact. At the same time, 
it is permitted to say that American power is potentially beneficent—
provided that you do not describe it as imperial. What is not allowed 
is to say that the United States is an empire and that this might not 
be wholly bad. My book Colossus set out to do this, and thereby suc-
ceeded in antagonizing both conservative and liberal critics. Conserva-
tives repudiated my contention that the United States is and, indeed, 
has always been an empire. They prefer to think of it as a hegemon, a 
superpower, a world leader—anything but an empire. Liberals were 
dismayed by my suggestion that the American empire might have 
positive as well as negative attributes. For them, American imperialism 
can have no redeeming features. It has been and must remain one of 
history’s Bad Things.
As in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Iolanthe, so in the United States today, it 
seems to be expected, “That every boy and every gal / That’s born into 
the world alive / Is either a little Liberal, / Or else a little Conservative!” 
But I am afraid my book is neither. Here, in a simplified form, is what 
it says:
3
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1.  The United States has always been, functionally if not self-con-
sciously, an empire;
2.  a self-conscious American imperialism might well be preferable to 
the available alternatives, but
3.  financial, human, and cultural constraints make such self-conscious-
ness highly unlikely, and
4.  therefore the American empire, insofar as it continues to exist, will 
remain a somewhat dysfunctional entity.
The case for an American empire in Colossus is therefore twofold. 
First, there is the case for its functional existence; second, the case for 
the potential advantages of a self-conscious American imperialism. By 
self-conscious imperialism, please note, I do not mean that the United 
States should unabashedly proclaim itself an empire and its president 
an emperor. Perish the thought. I merely mean that Americans need to 
recognize the imperial characteristics of their own power today and, if 
possible, to learn from the achievements and failures of past empires. 
It is no longer possible to maintain the fiction that there is something 
wholly unique about the foreign relations of the United States. The 
dilemmas America faces today have more in common with those faced 
by the later Caesars than with those faced by the Founding Fathers.3
At the same time, however, the book makes clear the grave perils 
of being an “empire in denial.” Americans are not wholly oblivious 
to the imperial role their country plays in the world. But they dislike 
it. “I think we’re trying to run the business of the world too much,” 
a Kansas farmer told the British author Timothy Garton Ash in 2003, 
“…like the Romans used to.”4 To such feelings of unease, American 
politicians respond with a categorical reassurance. “We’re not an impe-
rial power,” declared President George W. Bush last April, “We’re a 
liberating power.”5
Of all the misconceptions that need to be dispelled here, this is per-
haps the most obvious: that simply because Americans say they do 
not “do” empire, there cannot be such a thing as American imperial-
ism. As I write, American troops are engaged in defending govern-
ments forcibly called into being by the United States in two distant 
countries, Afghanistan and Iraq. They are likely to be there for some 
years to come. Even President Bush’s vanquished Democratic rival 
John Kerry implied last September that, if he were elected, U.S. forces 
would be withdrawn from Iraq within four years—not, in other words, 
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the day after his inauguration.6 Iraq, however, is only the front line 
of an American imperium, which, like all the great world empires of 
history, aspires to much more than just military dominance along a 
vast and variegated strategic frontier.7 Empire also means economic, 
cultural, and political predominance within (and sometimes also out-
side) that frontier. On November 6, 2003, in his speech to mark the 
20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, President 
Bush set out a vision of American foreign policy that, for all its Wilso-
nian language, strongly implied the kind of universal, civilizing mis-
sion that has been a feature of all the great empires:
The United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of free-
dom in the Middle East… . The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart 
of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic 
revolution… . The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is 
the calling of our country… . We believe that liberty is the design of 
nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that 
human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of lib-
erty. And we believe that freedom—the freedom we prize—is not for us 
alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind.8
He restated this messianic credo in his speech to the Republican 
Party convention in September 2004:
The story of America is the story of expanding liberty: an ever-widen-
ing circle, constantly growing to reach further and include more. Our 
nation’s founding commitment is still our deepest commitment: In our 
world, and here at home, we will extend the frontiers of freedom… . We 
are working to advance liberty in the broader Middle East because free-
dom will bring a future of hope and the peace we all want… . Freedom 
is on the march. I believe in the transformational power of liberty: The 
wisest use of American strength is to advance freedom.9
To the majority of Americans, it would appear, there is no contra-
diction between the ends of global democratization and the means of 
American military power. As defined by their president, the democ-
ratizing mission of the United States is both altruistic and distinct 
from the ambitions of past empires, which (so it is generally assumed) 
aimed to impose their own rule on foreign peoples. The difficulty is 
that President Bush’s ideal of “Freedom” as a universal desideratum 
rather closely resembles the Victorian ideal of “Civilization.” On close 
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inspection, Freedom means the American model of democracy and 
capitalism. When Americans speak of “nation building” they actually 
mean “state replicating,” in the sense that they want to build political 
and economic institutions that are fundamentally similar, though not 
necessarily identical, to their own.10 They may not aspire to rule, but 
they do aspire to have others rule themselves in the American way. Yet 
the very act of imposing freedom simultaneously subverts it. Just as 
the Victorians seemed hypocritical when they spread Civilization with 
the Maxim gun, so there is something suspect about those who would 
democratize Fallujah with the Abrams tank. President Bush’s distinc-
tion between conquest and liberation would have been entirely familiar 
to the liberal imperialists of the early 1900s, who likewise saw Britain’s 
far-flung legions as agents of emancipation (not least in the Middle 
East during and after World War I). Equally familiar to that earlier gen-
eration would have been the impatience of American officials to hand 
over sovereignty to an Iraqi government sooner rather than later. Indi-
rect rule—which installed nominally independent native rulers while 
leaving British civilian administrators and military forces in practical 
control of financial matters and military security—was the preferred 
model for British colonial expansion in many parts of Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East. Iraq itself was an example of indirect rule after 
the Hashemite dynasty was established there in the 1920s. The crucial 
question today is whether or not the United States has the capabilities, 
both material and moral, to make a success of its version of indirect 
rule. The danger lies in the inclination of American politicians, eager to 
live up to their own emancipatory rhetoric as well as to “bring the boys 
back home,” to withdraw from their overseas commitments prema-
turely—in short, to opt for premature decolonization rather than sus-
tained indirect rule. Unfortunately, history shows that the most violent 
time in the life of an empire often comes at the moment of its dissolu-
tion, precisely because the withdrawal of imperial troops unleashes a 
struggle between rival local elites for control of the indigenous armed 
forces.
*****
But is the very concept of empire itself an anachronism? A number of 
critics have objected that imperialism was a discreet historical phe-
nomenon that reached its apogee in the late 19th century and has been 
Niall Ferguson
7
defunct since the 1950s. “The Age of Empire is passed,” declared the 
New York Times as L. Paul Bremer III left Baghdad:
The experience of Iraq has demonstrated…that when America does 
not disguise its imperial force, when a proconsul leads an ‘occupying 
power,’ it is liable to find itself in an untenable position quickly enough. 
There are three reasons: the people being governed do not accept such 
a form of rule, the rest of the world does not accept it and Americans 
themselves do not accept it.11
As one reviewer of Colossus put it, “nationalism is a much more 
powerful force now than it was during the heyday of the Victorian 
era.”12 According to another, the book failed “to come to terms with 
the tectonic changes wrought by independence movements and ethnic 
and religious politics in the years since the end of World War II.”13 A 
favorite argument of journalists is, perhaps not surprisingly, that the 
power of the modern media makes it impossible for empires to operate 
as they did in the past, because their misdeeds are so quickly broadcast 
to an indignant world.
Such arguments betray a touching naiveté about both the past and 
the present. First, empire was no temporary condition of the Victorian 
age. Empires, by contrast, can be traced back as far as recorded history 
goes. Indeed, most history is in fact the history of empires precisely 
because empires are so good at recording, replicating, and transmit-
ting their own words and deeds. It is the nation-state—an essentially 
19th-century ideal type—that is the historical novelty and which may 
yet prove to be the more ephemeral entity. Given the ethnic hetero-
geneity and restless mobility of mankind, that is scarcely surprising. 
On close inspection, many of the most successful nation-states of the 
present started life as empires. What is the modern United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland if not the legatee of an earlier 
English imperialism?
Secondly, it is a Rooseveltian fantasy that in 1945 the age of empire 
came to an end amid a global springtime of the peoples. On the con-
trary, the Second World War merely saw the defeat of three would-be 
empires—the German, Japanese, and Italian—by an alliance between 
the old Western European empires (principally the British, since the 
others were so swiftly beaten) and two newer empires, those of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Though the United States for the 
most part ran an “empire by invitation” (to the extent that it was more a 
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hegemon, in the sense of an alliance leader, than an empire), the Soviet 
Union was and remained a true empire until its precipitous decline 
and fall. Moreover, the other great Communist power to emerge from 
the 1940s, the People’s Republic of China, remains in many respects an 
empire to this day. Its three most extensive provinces, Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang and Tibet, were all acquired as a result of Chinese impe-
rial expansion, and China continues to lay claim to Taiwan as well as 
numerous smaller islands, to say nothing of some territories in Russian 
Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Empires, in short, are always with us. Nor is it immediately obvi-
ous why the modern media should reduce the capacity of empires to 
sustain themselves. The growth of the popular press did nothing to 
weaken the British Empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; on 
the contrary, the mass-circulation newspapers tended to enhance the 
popular legitimacy of the Empire. Anyone who watched how Ameri-
can television networks covered the invasion of Iraq ought to under-
stand that the mass media are not necessarily solvents of imperial 
power. As for nationalism, it is something of a myth that this was what 
brought down the old empires of Western Europe. Far more lethal to 
their longevity were the costs of fighting rival empires, empires that 
were still more contemptuous of the principle of self-determination.14
Another common misconception is that the United States can and 
should achieve its international objectives—above all, its own secu-
rity—as a hegemon rather than an empire, “relying on soft power” as 
much as on hard power.15 Closely allied to this idea are the assump-
tions that there will always be less violence in the absence of an empire 
than in its presence, and that the United States would therefore make 
the world a safer place if it brought its troops home from the Middle 
East. One way to test such arguments is to ask the counterfactual ques-
tion: Would American foreign policy have been more effective in the 
past four years—or, if you prefer, would the world be a safer place 
today—if Afghanistan and Iraq had not been invaded? In the case of 
Afghanistan, there is little question that soft power would not have 
sufficed to oust the sponsors of Al-Qaida from their stronghold in 
Kabul. In the case of Iraq, it is surely better that Saddam Hussein is the 
prisoner of an elected Iraqi government than still reigning in Baghdad. 
Open-ended “containment,” which was effectively what the French 
government argued for in 2003, would, on balance, have been a worse 
policy. Policing Iraq from the air while periodically firing missiles at 
suspect installations was costing money without solving the problem 
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posed by Saddam. Sanctions may have disarmed Saddam (at the time, 
of course, we could not be sure) but they were also depriving ordinary 
Iraqis. In any case, the sanctions regime was on the point of collapse 
thanks to a systematic campaign by Saddam’s regime to buy votes in 
the United Nations Security Council, a campaign of corruption that 
was made easy by the United Nations’ Oil for Food program. In short, 
the policy of regime change was right; arguably, the principal defect of 
American policy toward Iraq was that the task had been left undone 
for twelve years. Those who fret about the doctrine of preemption 
enunciated in President Bush’s National Security Strategy should bear 
in mind that the overthrow of Saddam was as much “post-emption” as 
preemption, since Saddam had done nearly all the mischief of which 
he was capable some time before March 2003.
Yet it would be absurd to deny that much of what has happened in 
the past year—to say nothing of what has been revealed about earlier 
events—has tended to undermine the legitimacy of the Bush adminis-
tration’s policy. To put it bluntly: What went wrong? And has the very 
notion of an American empire been discredited?
The first seed of future troubles was the administration’s decision 
to treat suspected Al-Qaida personnel captured in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere as “unlawful enemy combatants,” beyond the scope of both 
American and international law. Prisoners were held incommunicado 
and indefinitely at Guantánamo Bay. As the rules governing interroga-
tion were chopped and changed, many of these prisoners were sub-
jected to forms of mental and physical intimidation that in some cases 
amounted to torture.16 Indeed, Justice Department memoranda were 
written to rationalize the use of torture as a matter for presidential 
discretion in time of war. Evidently, some members of the administra-
tion felt that extreme measures were justified by the shadowy nature 
of the foe they faced, while at the same time being legitimized by the 
public appetite for retribution after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001. All of this the Supreme Court rightly denounced in its sting-
ing judgment delivered in June 2004. As the Justices put it, not even 
the imperatives of resisting “an assault by the forces of tyranny” could 
justify the use by an American president of “the tools of tyrants.” Yet 
power corrupts, and even small amounts of power can corrupt a very 
great deal. It may not have been official policy to flout the Geneva Con-
ventions in Iraq, but not enough was done by senior officers to protect 
prisoners held at Abu Ghraib from gratuitous abuse (what the inquiry 
chaired by James Schlesinger called “free-lance activities on the part 
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of the night shift”).17 The photographic evidence of these “activities” 
has done more than anything else to discredit the claim of the United 
States and its allies to stand not merely for an abstract liberty but also 
for the effective rule of law.
Second, it was more than mere exaggeration on the part of Vice 
President Cheney, the former C.I.A. chief George Tenet, and ultimately 
President Bush himself—to say nothing of British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair—to claim they knew for certain that Saddam Hussein pos-
sessed weapons of mass destruction. It was, we now know, a down-
right lie that went far beyond what the available intelligence indicated. 
What they could legitimately have said was this: “After all his eva-
sions, we simply can’t be sure whether or not Saddam Hussein has 
any WMD. So, on the precautionary principle, we just can’t leave him 
in power indefinitely. Better safe than sorry.” But that was not enough 
for Cheney, who felt compelled to make the bald assertion that “Sad-
dam Hussein possesses weapons of mass destruction.” Bush himself 
had his doubts, but was reassured by Tenet that it was a “slam-dunk 
case.”18 Other doubters soon fell into line. Still more misleading was 
the administration’s allegation that Saddam was “teaming up with 
al-Qaida.” Sketchy evidence of contacts between the two was used to 
insinuate Iraqi complicity in the September 11 attacks, for which not a 
shred of proof has been found.
Third, it was a near disaster that responsibility for the postwar occu-
pation of Iraq was seized by the Defense Department, intoxicated as its 
principals became in the heat of their blitzkrieg. The State Department 
had spent long hours preparing a plan for the aftermath of a successful 
invasion. That plan was simply discarded by Secretary Donald Rums-
feld and his close advisers, who were convinced that once Saddam had 
gone, Iraq would magically reconstruct itself (after a period of suitably 
ecstatic celebration at the advent of freedom). As one official told the 
Financial Times last year, Under-Secretary Douglas Feith led:
a group in the Pentagon who all along felt that this was going to be not 
just a cakewalk, it was going to be 60–90 days, a flip-over and hand-off, 
a lateral or whatever to…the INC [Iraqi National Congress]. The DoD 
[Department of Defense] could then wash its hands of the whole affair 
and depart quickly, smoothly and swiftly. And there would be a demo-
cratic Iraq that was amenable to our wishes and desires left in its wake. 
And that’s all there was to it.19
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When General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, stated in late 
February 2003 that “something of the order of several hundred thou-
sand soldiers” would be required to stabilize postwar Iraq, he was 
brusquely put down by Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz as “wildly off 
the mark.” Wolfowitz professed himself “reasonably certain” that the 
Iraqi people would “greet us as liberators.” Such illusions were not, it 
should be remembered, confined to neoconservatives in the Pentagon. 
Even General Tommy Franks was under the impression that it would 
be possible to reduce troop levels to just 50,000 after eighteen months. 
It was left to Secretary of State Colin Powell to point out to the presi-
dent that “regime change” had serious—not to say imperial—implica-
tions. The Pottery Barn rule, he suggested to Bush, was bound to be 
applicable to Iraq: “You break it, you own it.”20
Fourth, American diplomacy in 2003 was like the two-headed Push-
mepullyou in Dr. Doolittle, it pointed in opposite directions. On one 
side was Cheney, dismissing the United Nations as a negligible factor. 
On the other was Powell, insisting that any action would require some 
form of U.N. authorization to be legitimate. It is possible that one of 
these approaches might have worked. It was, however, hopeless to try 
to face both ways. Europe was in fact coming around as a consequence 
of some fairly successful diplomatic browbeating. No fewer than eigh-
teen European governments signed letters expressing support for the 
impending war against Saddam. Yet the decision to seek a second U.N. 
resolution, on the grounds that the language of Resolution 1441 was 
not strong enough to justify all-out war, was a blunder that allowed 
the French government to regain the initiative by virtue of its perma-
nent seat on the U.N. Security Council. Despite the fact that more than 
forty countries declared their support for the invasion of Iraq and three 
(Britain, Australia, and Poland) sent troops, the threat of a French veto, 
delivered with a Gallic flourish, created the indelible impression that 
the United States was acting unilaterally—and even illegally.21
All of these mistakes had one thing in common: they sprang from 
a failure to learn from history. For among the most obvious lessons of 
history is that an empire cannot rule by coercion alone. It needs, above 
all, legitimacy—in the eyes of the subject people, in the eyes of the 
other Great Powers and, most crucially, in the eyes of the people back 
home. Did those concerned know no history? We are told that Presi-
dent Bush was reading Edward Morris’s Theodore Rex as the war in Iraq 
was being planned. Presumably, he had not reached the part where the 
American occupation sparked off a Filipino insurrection. Before the 
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invasion of Iraq, Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley 
was heard to refer to a purely unilateral American invasion as “the 
imperial option.” Did no one else grasp that occupying and trying to 
transform Iraq (with or without allies) was a quintessentially imperial 
undertaking—and one that would not only cost money but would also 
take many years to succeed?
*****
Had policymakers troubled to consider what befell the last Anglo-
phone occupation of Iraq, they might have been less surprised by the 
persistent resistance in certain parts of the country during 2004. For in 
May 1920 there was a major anti-British revolt in Iraq. This happened 
six months after a referendum (in practice, a round of consultation with 
tribal leaders) on the country’s future, and just after the announcement 
that Iraq would become a League of Nations “mandate” under British 
trusteeship rather than continue under colonial rule. Strikingly, neither 
consultation with Iraqis nor the promise of internationalization suf-
ficed to avert an uprising.
In 1920, as in 2004, the insurrection had religious origins and lead-
ers, but it soon transcended the country’s ancient ethnic and sectarian 
divisions. The first anti-British demonstrations were in the mosques 
of Baghdad, but the violence quickly spread to the Shiite holy city of 
Karbala, where British rule was denounced by Ayatollah Muhammad 
Taqi al-Shirazi, the historical counterpart of today’s Shiite firebrand, 
Moktada al-Sadr. At its height, the revolt stretched as far north as the 
Kurdish city of Kirkuk and as far south as Samawah. Then, as in 2004, 
much of the violence was more symbolic than strategically significant; 
British bodies were mutilated, much as American bodies were at Fal-
lujah. But there was a real threat to the British position. The rebels sys-
tematically sought to disrupt the occupiers’ infrastructure, attacking 
railways and telegraph lines. In some places, British troops and civil-
ians were cut off and besieged. By August 1920 the situation in Iraq 
was so desperate that the general in charge appealed to London not 
only for reinforcements but also for chemical weapons (mustard gas 
bombs or shells), though, contrary to historical legend, these turned 
out to be unavailable and so were never used.22
This brings us to the second lesson the United States might have 
learned from the British experience. Reestablishing order is no easy 
task. In 1920 the British eventually ended the rebellion through a com-
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bination of aerial bombardment and punitive village-burning expedi-
tions. Even Winston Churchill, then the minister responsible for the 
Royal Air Force, was shocked by the actions of some trigger-happy 
pilots and vengeful ground troops. And despite their overwhelming 
technological superiority, British forces still suffered more than 2,000 
dead and wounded. Moreover, the British had to keep troops in Iraq 
long after the country was granted “full sovereignty.” Although Iraq 
was declared formally independent in 1932, British troops remained 
there until 1955.
Is history repeating itself? For all the talk there was in June 2004 of 
restoring “full sovereignty” to an interim Iraqi government, President 
Bush made it clear that he intended to “maintain our troop level…as 
long as necessary” and that U.S. troops would continue to operate 
“under American command.” This in itself implied something sig-
nificantly less than full sovereignty. If the new Iraqi government did 
not have control over a well-armed foreign army in its own territory, 
then it lacked one of the defining characteristics of a sovereign state: 
a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. That was precisely 
the point made in April by Marc Grossman, Under-Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, during Congressional hearings on the future of 
Iraq. In Grossman’s words: “The arrangement would be, I think as we 
are doing today, that we would do our very best to consult with that 
interim government and take their views into account.” But American 
commanders would still “have the right, and the power, and the obli-
gation” to decide on the appropriate role for their troops.23
There is, in principle, nothing inherently wrong with “limited sov-
ereignty.” In both West Germany and Japan sovereignty was limited 
for some years after 1945. Sovereignty is not an absolute but a relative 
concept. Indeed, it is a common characteristic of empires that they 
consist of multiple tiers of sovereignty. In what Charles Maier has 
called the “fractal geometry of empire,” the superstructure of imperial 
power contains within it multiple scaled-down versions of itself, none 
fully sovereign. In other words, there are “micro” chains of command 
within each link of the “macro” chain of command. Again, however, 
there is a need for American policymakers and voters to understand 
the imperial business they are now in. For this business can have costly 
overheads.
Macalester International  Vol. 16
14
*****
The problem is that for indirect rule, or limited sovereignty, to be suc-
cessful in Iraq, Americans must be willing to foot a substantial bill for 
the occupation and reconstruction of the country. Unfortunately, in the 
absence of a radical change in the direction of U.S. fiscal policy, their 
ability to do so is set to diminish, if not to disappear.
Since President Bush’s election, total federal outlays have risen by an 
estimated $530 billion, a 30% increase. This increase can be attributed 
only partly to the wars the administration has waged. Higher defense 
expenditures account for just 30% of the total increment, whereas 
increased spending on health care accounts for 17%, Social Security 
and income security for 16% apiece, and Medicare for 14%.24 The real-
ity is that the Bush administration has raised expenditure on welfare 
by rather more than spending on warfare. Meanwhile, even as expen-
diture has risen, there has been a steep reduction in the federal gov-
ernment’s revenues, which have slumped from 21% of gross domestic 
product in 2000 to less than 16% in 2004.25 The recession of 2001 played 
only a minor role in creating this shortfall of receipts. More important 
were the three successive tax cuts enacted by the administration with 
the support of the Republican-led Congress, beginning with the ini-
tial $1.35 trillion tax cut over ten years and the $38 billion tax rebate 
of the Economic Growth and Tax Reform Reconciliation Act in 2001, 
continuing with the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act in 2002, 
and concluding with the reform of the double taxation of dividend 
income in 2003. With a combined value of $188 billion—equivalent to 
around 2% of the 2003 national income—these tax cuts were signifi-
cantly larger than those passed in Ronald Reagan’s Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981.26 The effect of this combination of increased spending 
and reduced revenue has been a dramatic growth in the federal deficit. 
Bush inherited a surplus of around $236 billion from the fiscal year 
2000. At the time of writing, the projected deficit for 2004 was $413 
billion, representing a swing from the black into the red of nearly two-
thirds of a trillion dollars.27
Government spokesmen have sometimes defended this borrowing 
spree as a stimulus to economic activity. There are good reasons to 
be skeptical, however, not least because the principal beneficiaries of 
these tax cuts have been the very wealthy. (Vice-President Cheney 
belied the macroeconomic argument when he justified the third tax 
cut in the following candid terms: “We won the midterms. This is 
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our due.”28) Another Cheney aphorism that is bound to be quoted by 
future historians is his assertion that “Reagan proved deficits don’t 
matter.”29 But Reagan did nothing of the kind. The need to raise taxes 
to bring the deficit back under control was one of the key factors in 
George H. W. Bush’s defeat in 1992. In turn, the systematic reduction of 
the deficit under Bill Clinton was one of the reasons long-term interest 
rates declined and the economy boomed in the later 1990s. The only 
reason that, under Bush junior, deficits have not seemed to matter is 
the persistence of low interest rates over the past four years, which has 
allowed Bush, in common with many American households, to borrow 
more while paying less in debt service. Net interest payments on the 
federal debt amounted to just 1.4% of the GDP last year, whereas the 
figure was 2.3% in 2000 and 3.2% in 1995.30
Yet this persistence of low long-term interest rates is not a result of 
ingenuity on the part of the U.S. Treasury. It is in part a consequence of 
the willingness of the Asian central banks to buy vast quantities of dol-
lar-denominated securities, such as 10-year Treasury bonds, with the 
primary motivation of keeping their currencies pegged to the dollar, 
and with the secondary consequence of funding the Bush deficits.31 It 
is no coincidence that around half the publicly held federal debt is now 
in foreign hands, more than double the proportion ten years ago.32 Not 
since the days of Czarist Russia has a great empire relied so heavily on 
lending from abroad. The trouble is that these flows of foreign capi-
tal into the United States cannot be relied on indefinitely, especially 
if there is a likelihood of rising deficits in the future. That is why the 
Bush administration’s failure to address the fundamental question of 
fiscal reform is so important. The reality is that the official figures 
for both the deficit and the accumulated federal debt understate the 
magnitude of the country’s impending fiscal problems because they 
leave out of account the huge and unfunded liabilities of the Medicare 
and Social Security systems.33 The United States derives a significant 
benefit from the status of the dollar as the world’s principal reserve 
currency; it is one reason why foreign investors are prepared to hold 
such large volumes of dollar-denominated assets. But reserve-currency 
status is not divinely ordained. It could be undermined if international 
markets take fright at the magnitude of America’s still latent fiscal 
crisis.34 A decline in the dollar would certainly hurt foreign holders 
of U.S. currency more than it would hurt Americans. But a shift in 
international expectations about U.S. finances might also bring about 
a sharp increase in long-term interest rates, which would have imme-
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diate and negative feedback effects on the federal deficit by pushing 
up the cost of debt service.35 It would also hurt highly leveraged (or 
indebted) American households, especially the rising proportion of 
them with adjustable-rate mortgages.36
Empires need not be a burden on the taxpayers of the metropolis; 
indeed, many empires have arisen precisely in order to shift tax bur-
dens from the center to the periphery. Yet there is little sign that the 
United States will be able to achieve even a modest amount of “burden 
sharing” in the foreseeable future. During the Cold War, American 
allies contributed at least some money and considerable manpower 
to the maintenance of the West’s collective security. But those days 
are gone. At the Democratic Party convention in Boston last summer, 
John Kerry pledged to “bring our allies to our side and share the bur-
den, reduce the cost to American taxpayers, and reduce the risk to 
American soldiers,” in order to “get the job done and bring our troops 
home.” “We don’t have to go it alone in the world,” he declared, “and 
we need to rebuild our alliances.”37 Yet even if he had won in Novem-
ber, it is far from clear that Kerry would have been able to persuade 
the Europeans to commit significant resources to Iraq. In accepting his 
party’s nomination, the Massachusetts Senator recalled how, as a boy, 
he watched “British, French and American troops” working together 
in post-war Berlin. In those days, however, there was a much bigger 
incentive—symbolized by the Red Army units that surrounded West 
Berlin—for European states to support American foreign policy. It is 
not that the French and the Germans (or for that matter the British) 
were passionately pro-American during the Cold War. On the con-
trary, American experts constantly fretted about the levels of popular 
anti-Americanism in Europe, on both the Left and the Right. Never-
theless, as long as there was a Soviet Union to the East, there was one 
overwhelming argument for the unity of “the West.” That ceased to 
be the case fifteen years ago, when the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev 
caused the Soviet empire to crumble. Ever since then, the incentives 
for transatlantic harmony have grown steadily weaker. Europeans do 
not regard the threat posed by Islamist terrorism as sufficiently seri-
ous to justify unconditional solidarity with the United States. On the 
contrary, since the Spanish general election in March 2004, they have 
acted as if the optimal response to the growing threat of Islamist ter-
rorism is to distance themselves from the United States. An astonish-
ingly large number of Europeans see the United States as itself a threat 
to international stability. In a recent Gallup poll, 61% of Europeans said 
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they thought the European Union plays “a positive role with regard to 
peace in the world,” while just 8% said its role was negative. No fewer 
than 50% of those polled took the view that the United States now 
plays a negative role.38
*****
So the United States is what it would rather not be: a Colossus to some, 
a Goliath to others—an empire that dare not speak its name.39 Yet what 
is the alternative to American empire? If, as so many people seem to 
wish, the United States were to scale back its military commitments 
overseas, then what?
We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the 
history of world politics, it seems that someone is always the hegemon 
or is bidding to play that role. Today, it is the United States; a century 
ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and 
so on. The great 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke 
portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mas-
tery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent 
conflict. More recent historians have inferred that as the superpowers 
of the Cold War era succumb to “overstretch,” their place may be taken 
by new powers. Once, the new powers were supposed to be Germany 
and Japan. These days, wary realists warn of the ascent of China and 
the European Union. Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; 
the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The “unipo-
larity” identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse 
cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a 
hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we 
must go to a multipolar, multipower world. In other words, if the 
United States were to conclude from its experience in Iraq that the time 
had come to abandon its imperial pretensions, some other power or 
powers would soon seize the opportunity to bid for hegemony.
But what if no successor were to emerge? What if, instead of a bal-
ance of power, there was an absence of power? Such a situation is 
not unknown in history. Unfortunately, the world’s experience with 
power vacuums (or eras of “apolarity,” if you will) is hardly encourag-
ing. Anyone who looks forward eagerly to an American retreat from 
hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world 
of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon may be the real 
alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean not the 
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pacifist utopia envisaged in John Lennon’s dirge Imagine, but an anar-
chic new Dark Age.
Why might a power vacuum arise early in the 21st century? The 
reasons are not hard to imagine. Consider the three principal contend-
ers for the succession if the United States were to succumb to imperial 
decline. Impressive though the European Union’s recent enlargement 
has been (not to mention the achievement of a twelve-country mon-
etary union), the reality is that demographic trends almost certainly 
condemn Europe to decline. With fertility rates dropping and life 
expectancies rising, Western European societies are projected to have 
median ages in the upper 40s by the middle of this century. Indeed, 
“Old Europe” will soon be truly old. By 2050, one in every three Ital-
ians, Spaniards, and Greeks is expected to be 65 or older, even allow-
ing for ongoing immigration.40 Europeans therefore face an agonizing 
choice between Americanizing their economies (i.e., opening their bor-
ders to much more immigration, with all the cultural changes that 
would entail) or transforming their Union into a kind of fortified 
retirement community, in which a dwindling proportion of employees 
shoulder the rising cost of outmoded welfare systems. These problems 
are compounded by the Euro area’s sluggish growth, a consequence 
of labor market rigidities, high marginal tax rates, and relatively low 
labor inputs (notably in terms of working hours).41 Meanwhile, the 
EU’s still incomplete constitutional reforms mean that individual Euro-
pean nation-states continue to enjoy considerable autonomy outside 
the economic sphere, particularly in foreign and security policy.
Optimistic observers of China insist the economic miracle of the past 
decade will endure, with growth continuing at such a pace that within 
thirty or forty years China’s gross domestic product will surpass that 
of the United States.42 Yet it is far from clear that the normal rules for 
emerging markets have been suspended for Beijing’s benefit. First, a 
fundamental incompatibility exists between the free-market economy, 
based inevitably on private property and the rule of law, and the Com-
munist monopoly on power, which breeds corruption and impedes the 
creation of transparent fiscal, monetary, and regulatory institutions. 
As is common in “Asian Tiger” economies, production is running far 
ahead of domestic consumption (thus making the economy heavily 
dependent on exports) and even further ahead of domestic financial 
development. Indeed, no one knows the full extent of the problems in 
the Chinese domestic banking sector.43 Those Western banks that are 
buying up bad debts to establish themselves in China need remind-
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ing that this strategy was tried once before, a century ago, in the era 
of the Open Door policy, when American and European firms rushed 
into China only to see their investments vanish amid the turmoil of 
war and revolution. Then, as now, hopes for China’s development ran 
euphorically high, especially in the United States. But those hopes 
were dashed, and could be disappointed again. A Chinese currency 
or banking crisis could have immense ramifications, especially when 
Western investors confront the difficulty of repatriating assets held in 
China. When foreigners invest directly in factories rather than through 
intermediaries such as bond markets, there is no real need for capital 
controls. It is no easy thing to repatriate a steel mill.
With birthrates in Muslim societies more than double the European 
average, the Islamic countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East 
are bound to put some kind of pressure on Europe and the United 
States in the years ahead. If, for example, the population of Yemen 
could exceed that of Germany by 2050 (as the United Nations fore-
casts), there must either be a dramatic improvement in the Middle 
East’s economic performance or substantial emigration from the Arab 
world to aging Europe. Yet the subtle Muslim colonization of Europe’s 
cities—most striking in France, where North Africans populate whole 
suburbs of cities like Marseille and Paris—may not necessarily portend 
the advent of a new and menacing “Eurabia.”44 In fact, the Muslim 
world is as divided as ever, and not merely along the traditional fis-
sure between Sunnis and Shiites. It is also split between those Muslims 
seeking a peaceful modus vivendi with the West (an impulse embodied 
in the Turkish government’s desire to join the EU) and those drawn to 
the revolutionary Islamism of renegades like Osama bin Laden. Opin-
ion polls from Morocco to Pakistan suggest high levels of anti-Ameri-
can sentiment, but not unanimity. In Europe, only a minority expresses 
overt sympathy for terrorist organizations. Most young Muslims in 
England still seem to prefer assimilation to jihad. We are still a long 
way from a bipolar clash of civilizations, much less the rise of a new 
caliphate that might pose a geopolitical threat to the United States and 
its allies.
In short, two of the obvious potential successors to the United States, 
the European Union and China, seem to contain within them the seeds 
of future decline; while Islam remains a diffuse force in world politics, 
lacking the resources of a superpower.
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*****
Let us now imagine that American neoconservative hubris meets its 
nemesis in Iraq and that the Bush administration’s project to democ-
ratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in ignominious withdrawal. 
Suppose also that no aspiring rival power steps in to fill the resulting 
vacuums—not only in Iraq but conceivably also in Afghanistan, the 
Balkans, and Haiti. What would an apolar future look like? The answer 
is not easy, as there have been very few periods in world history with 
no contenders for the role of global, or at least regional, hegemon. The 
nearest approximation in modern times might be the 1920s, when the 
United States walked away from President Woodrow Wilson’s project 
of global democracy, and collective security centered on the League of 
Nations. There was certainly a power vacuum in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, 
and Ottoman empires, but it did not last long. The old West European 
empires were quick to snap up the choice leftovers of Ottoman rule in 
the Middle East. The Bolsheviks had reassembled the czarist empire by 
1922. And by 1936 German revanche was already well advanced.
One must go back much further in history to find a period of true 
and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the 9th and 10th centu-
ries. In this era, the two sundered halves of the Roman Empire—Rome 
and Byzantium—had long passed the height of their power. The lead-
ership of the Western half was divided between the pope, who led 
Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who split up his short-
lived empire under the Treaty of Verdun in 843. No credible claimant 
to the title of emperor emerged until Otto was crowned in 962, and 
even he was merely a German prince with pretensions (never realized) 
to rule Italy. Byzantium, meanwhile, was grappling with the Bulgar 
rebellion to the north, while the Abbasid caliphate, initially established 
by Abu al-Abbas in 750, was in steep decline by the middle of the 10th 
century. In China, too, imperial power was in a dip between the T’ang 
and Sung dynasties.
The weakness of the older empires allowed new and smaller enti-
ties to flourish. When the Khazar tribe converted to Judaism in 740, 
their khanate occupied a Eurasian power vacuum between the Black 
Sea and the Caspian Sea. In Kiev, far from the reach of Byzantium, 
the regent Olga laid the foundation for the future Russian Empire in 
957 when she embraced the Orthodox Church. The Seljuks, forebears 
of the Ottoman Turks, carved out the Sultanate of Rum as the Abba-
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sid caliphate lost its grip over Asia Minor. Africa had its mini-empire 
in Ghana; Central America had its Mayan civilization. Connections 
between all these entities were minimal or nonexistent. This condition 
was the antithesis of globalization. The world was broken up into dis-
connected, introverted civilizations.
One distinctive feature of the era was that, in the absence of strong 
secular polities, religious questions often produced serious convul-
sions. Indeed, it was religious institutions that often set the political 
agenda. In the 8th and 9th centuries, Byzantium was racked by con-
troversy over the proper role of icons in worship. By the 11th cen-
tury, the Pope felt confident enough to humble Holy Roman Emperor 
Henry IV during the battle over which of them should have the right 
to appoint bishops. The new monastic orders amassed considerable 
power in Christendom, particularly the Cluniacs, the first order to 
centralize monastic authority. In the Muslim world, it was the ulema 
(clerics) who truly ruled. This ascendancy of the clergy helps to explain 
why the period ended with the extraordinary holy wars known as the 
Crusades, the first of which was launched by European Christians in 
1095. Yet this apparent clash of civilizations was in many ways just 
another example of the apolar world’s susceptibility to long-distance 
military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples. 
The Vikings repeatedly attacked West European towns in the 9th cen-
tury, including Nantes in 842 and Seville in 844, to name just two. One 
Frankish chronicler bemoaned “the endless flood of Vikings” sweep-
ing southward. Byzantium, too, was sacked in 860 by raiders from Rus, 
the kernel of the future Russia. This “fierce and savage tribe” showed 
“no mercy,” lamented the Byzantine patriarch. It was like “the roaring 
sea…destroying everything, sparing nothing.” Such were the condi-
tions of an anarchic age. Small wonder that the future seemed to lie in 
creating small, defensible political units like the Venetian republic (the 
quintessential city-state, which was conducting its own foreign policy 
by 840) or Alfred the Great’s England (arguably the first thing resem-
bling a nation-state in European history, created in 886).
Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the 
age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling 
differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world’s established pow-
ers retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what 
of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies 
created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War? The United 
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
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World Trade Organization all consider themselves in some way repre-
sentative of the “international community.” Surely their aspirations to 
global governance point to the true alternative to American empire: a 
new “Light Age” of collective security and international law, the very 
antithesis of the Dark Ages?45 Yet universal claims were also an integral 
part of the rhetoric of that distant era. All the empires maintained that 
they ruled the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civiliza-
tions, may have even believed that they did. The reality, however, was 
not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven, but 
political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining char-
acteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational 
institutions, but downward.
With the end of the state’s monopoly on the means of violence and 
the collapse of its control over channels of communication, humanity 
has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as inte-
gration. If free flows of information and of the means of production 
empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the 
free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organiza-
tions and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever 
they choose, from New York to Najaf, from Madrid to Moscow. By con-
trast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, 
in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic outposts such as Kabul 
and Pristina. In short, it is the non-state actors who truly wield global 
power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time.
Waning empires, religious revivals, incipient anarchy, a retreat into 
fortified cities—these are the Dark Age experiences that a post-impe-
rial world could find itself reliving. The symptoms are already not 
far to seek. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be 
altogether more dangerous than the Dark Age of the 9th and 10th 
centuries. The world is much more populous, roughly twenty times 
more. Technology has transformed production. Now human societies 
depend not merely on fresh water and the harvest but also on finite 
supplies of fossil fuels that pollute the earth’s atmosphere, altering its 
climate even as they are used. Technology has upgraded destruction, 
too. It is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For all 
these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should perturb us today 
a great deal more than it perturbed the heirs of Charlemagne. If the 
United States is to retreat from global hegemony—its fragile self-image 
dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home 
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and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of 
multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. 
For the alternative to unipolarity may not be multipolarity at all. It 
could be apolarity, a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous 
forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new 
world disorder.
*****
The best case for empire is always the case for order. Liberty is, of 
course, a loftier goal. But only those who have never known disorder 
fail to grasp that order is the necessary precondition for liberty. In that 
sense, the case for American empire is simultaneously a case against 
international anarchy. None of this is to pretend that the United States 
is a perfect empire. Empires are by their very nature compromised by 
the power that they wield; they inexorably engender their own dis-
solution at home even as they impose order abroad. That is why our 
expectations should not be pitched too high. If it is hard enough to be 
an empire when you believe you have a mandate from heaven, how 
much harder is it for the United States, which believes that heaven 
intended it to free the world, not rule it! Sadly, there are still a few 
places in the world that must be ruled before they can be freed. Sadly, 
the act of ruling them will sorely try Americans, who instinctively 
begrudge such places the blood, treasure, and time that they consume. 
Yet, saddest of all, there seems to be no better alternative for the United 
States and the world. Once, a hundred and sixty years ago, America’s 
imperial destiny seemed manifest. It has since become obscure. But it 
is America’s destiny just the same. •
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